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THE AUTHOR EMPLOYS INTERVIEW DATA FROM SAMPLES OF CONVENTION DELEGATES OF BOTH PARTIES IN 1976 TO REEXAMINE AARON WILDAVSKY'S THEORY OF THE 'TWO PRESIDENCIES'. CONTRARY TO PEPPERS' 1974 ARGUMENT THAT DUE, IN PART, TO RECENT EVENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS THE TWO PRESIDENCIES (DOMESTIC AND FORPOLICY ORIENTED) HAVE BECOME ONE, THE AUTHOR'S DATA SUGGEST SUPPORT FOR THE WILDAVSKY HYPOTHESIS.

IN THIS ARTICLE THE AUTHOR EMPLOYS NEW MEASURES OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT THAT ALLOW US TO DISAGGREGATE THE SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT IN CONGRESS. WHEN THIS IS DONE, IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT ALL THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR A PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICIES COMES FROM THE OPPOSITION PARTY, AND EVEN THIS SUPPORT HAS DIMINISHED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE 1950S. MOREOVER, THE SOURCE OF THE TWO PRESIDENCIES WAS IDEOLOGICAL AGREEMENT RATHER THAN CONGRESSIONAL BIPARTISANSHIP OR DEFERENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE PRESIDENT IN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING.

U.S. presidential-congressional relationships since World War II, seen characterized by a "presidency" for domestic policy and a "presidency" for defense and foreign policy.

Presidential-congressional relations scholars have long debated whether the president is more successful on foreign policy than on domestic policy (Wildavsky, 1966). The debate has focused on differential success rates between foreign and domestic policy and whether the gap has narrowed over time. This focus, however, neglects an important dimension of Wildavsky's argument. Wildavsky also argued that presidents should dominate Congress in foreign policy. Hence, the thesis predicts high levels of success on foreign policy as well as differences between foreign and domestic policy. Looking at the trends in success on foreign and domestic votes, we observe that whereas the difference between foreign and domestic success rates shows up consistently for minority presidents, the absolute level of support on foreign and defense issues has declined since the second Reagan administration. Analysis of opposition party base behavior reveals that foreign policy voting has become considerably more partisan.

View that the modern US presidential office consists of domestic and foreign policy presidencies; 8 articles. Some emphasis on the Reagan administration.

This article looks at the following two events that made the 2000 presidential election unique in US history: the Republican campaign to prevent a recount in that election & the two Supreme Court interventions that effectively completed the effort to prevent that recount from happening. Because of back room dealing overtaking the popular vote, the author argues that this election most closely resembles the election of 1860, which precipitated the Civil War, rather than the elections in 1824, 1876, & 1888, where one candidate won the electoral votes & the other candidate won the popular votes. The author concludes that Bush is the only truly illegitimate president in US history. G. Gifford

Aaron Wildavsky first proposed that presidents in the United States receive more support from Congress in foreign policy and thus can expect to wield more influence and discretion in this policy arena. Since that time, scholars have scrutinized Wildavsky's contention. A recent work by Fleisher et al., using a new measure of presidential support, argues convincingly that broad generalizations about the phenomenon of increased presidential support in foreign policy must be drawn tentatively. This article addresses the two‐presidencies thesis in three ways. First, the authors replicate a portion of Edwards's research to illustrate the reliability of our results. Second, the authors extend the data collection on more traditional measures used to test this thesis. Third, to address the issue of intermestic policy, the authors employ a new measure of presidential support that more carefully defines foreign and domestic policy actions. The analyses confirm the findings of Fleisher et al. and Edwards that the two‐presidencies phenomenon is largely idiographic.